Water security is a major challenge for science and society. We review the rapidly growing literature on water security from the perspective of risk science and management. Competing definitions and indicators of water security reflect unsettled conceptual and methodological issues. However, risk concepts have become prevalent in defining water security; measuring it quantitatively; tracking indicators of hazards, exposure, and vulnerability; and informing management options to reduce water-related risks. We examine water security indicators and indices to identify thresholds for waterrelated risks across multiple dimensions of water security and examine how these vary across different scales and socioeconomic contexts. Water security indicators reveal a disparity in hazards and vulnerability across geographic and political-economic conditions. Recognition of water security as a major societal challenge has been closely followed by a strong commitment to academic, government, development, and policy responses. Pathways to water security capture the sequence of investments in institutions and infrastructure to reduce water-related risks and manage trade-offs. Two well-studied water management case studies illustrate the pathways to water security and the need for more systematic comparative assessment. 
to shortages in the irrigation water supplies needed for reliable food systems (8) (9) (10) . Water service provision in cities is already a challenge, particularly at the peri-urban fringe. In the 2050s, approximately two-thirds of the global population is expected to live in cities (11) , which raises corresponding challenges of designing sustainable urban water services. Superimposed on these challenges are the impacts of climate variability, extremes, and change. Ninety percent of natural hazards are connected to water with disaster losses over US$110 billion in 2010 alone (12) . Hydrological extremes are associated with negative impacts on gross domestic product (GDP) growth (13) . These impacts are projected to intensify under global warming; based on scenarios with a 2
• C increase in global average temperature, the percentage of the global population living in conditions of absolute water scarcity [<500 m 3 /(person · year)] will increase from approximately 1.5% today to 9% in 2100 (14) .
Inadequate institutional capacity and infrastructure increase vulnerability to such threats. The OECD has defined the global water crisis as a crisis of fragmented governance. Conflict and competition over water between sovereign territories is also a perceived threat to geopolitical stability and peace (15) (16) (17) . Inadequate governance and financing have long-term impacts on economic development and human well-being. For example, the global water infrastructure financing gap to 2030 has been estimated at $US11.7 trillion (18) , and the cost of meeting the proposed water-related Sustainable Development Goals has been estimated at approximately 2% of annual GDP (19) .
Water security is therefore concerned with both chronic pressures and extreme events. Concepts of risk and vulnerability have become increasingly attractive for framing, measuring, and informing responses to such challenges and for bridging disciplines and scales (20) (21) (22) . The rest of this section tracks the evolution of water security definitions and the emergence of explicit risk framings. In Section 2, we review risk concepts associated with water security. Section 3 examines prominent indicators of water security as well as the emerging evidence on their explanatory factors and observed impacts. Sections 4 and 5 review risk management options and pathways to water security across different settings and scales.
Defining Water Security in Risk Terms
Water security has its roots in 1940s postwar diplomacy to redraw political boundaries of former colonial empires (15, 23) . Interest in water security has expanded since the United Nations (UN) Ministerial Declaration of The Hague on Water Security in the 21st Century was issued at the World Water Forum in 2000 (25) . The Ministerial Declaration led to wide use of the term in global policy, development, and science agendas over the past 15 years. In response, definitions have proliferated, generating both convergence and confusion about the concept and options for measuring and managing water security (24) .
The Ministerial Declaration describes the water security challenge as "ensuring that. . . ecosystems are protected and improved; that sustainable development and political stability are promoted, that every person has access to enough safe water at an affordable cost to lead a healthy and productive life and the vulnerable are protected from the risks of water-related hazards" (25, p. 1). The Declaration recognized the importance of managing risks and using targets and strategies to ensure these ends are achieved, and it highlights the growing focus on indicators of water security to track trends and inform management decisions.
The Global Water Partnership (GWP) (26, p. 18 ) recognized water security "as a common goal" in 2000 and proposed a framework for action designed to support a "mix [of investment options] tailored to. . .particular circumstances, existing resources and needs" at the local and country levels. Similar to the Ministerial Declaration, the GWP also identified targets for 2015 to adopt integrated water resources management (IWRM) in all countries, meet the MDGs for water and sanitation, increase the productivity of water in agriculture, reduce flood risk, and develop and implement national standards for freshwater ecosystem health.
The water security and growth session at the fourth World Water Forum in 2006 was an important milestone in recent science and policy agendas. Grey & Sadoff (27, 28) examine the relationship between water security and economic development by highlighting the development challenges in regions exposed to high levels of hydroclimatic variability. They hypothesize that a minimum platform of investment in infrastructure and institutions is needed to manage these challenges, particularly in economies dependent on rainfed agriculture (13, 29, 30) . This yielded a definition of water security based on water's productive uses and potential destructive impacts. Water security is the "availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to people, environments and economies" (27, p. 548) .
These definitions of water security vary in their origin, scale, emphasis, and engagement with issues and concepts of risk and uncertainty. Four dimensions of water security were noted in the debate of Cook & Bakker (24) : water stress and availability, vulnerability to hazards, human development needs, and sustainability; the first three can be understood through a risk lens (21) .
Most recently, UN Water (31, p. vi) used a dialogue process to define water security based on the multiple interests tied to it. The resulting working definition describes water security as the "capacity of a population to safeguard" access to water for livelihoods and development, protect against water pollution and water-related disasters, and preserve ecosystems in a "climate of peace and political stability." It explicitly acknowledges the need to manage risk and uncertainty among the essential elements of water security.
Consensus is unlikely for global water paradigms (32) , although the UN Water paper stresses the importance of mutually agreed-upon definitions to allow progress toward a shared goal. This builds on earlier commitments to standards and targets, which imply the development and monitoring of quantitative indicators. Risk concepts have supported recent policy initiatives to adopt common principles and indicators for water security that connect the science disciplines and bridge research and practitioner perspectives (see Table 1 ) (20) . Risk is explicit in the recent definition of water security as a "tolerable water-related risk to society" developed by former water agency directors and development practitioners (33, p. 4) . The OECD (7) adopted a risk-based approach to water security. Water security is "about managing water risk" (p. 13) to an acceptable level across four classes of chronic and episodic hazards: shortage, inadequate quality, excess (flooding), and diminished resilience of freshwater systems. This concept of water security is the basis for the OECD framework to "know, target and manage" (p. 12) water risks in a situation of uncertainty.
Risk-based approaches to decision making guided water management long before the contemporary interest in water security. The World Health Organization (WHO) Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality are an example of a risk-based approach to water security (34) . The guidelines use quantitative microbiological risk assessment and disability-adjusted life year as metrics and targets for tolerable risk. The former refers to the dose, response, and exposure associated with an infectious organism, whereas the latter refers to the years lost from a healthy life owing to poor drinking water quality. The drinking water quality targets are guideline values, and countries have a mandate to set enforceable limits on the basis of what constitutes tolerable risk at that place and time.
The WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality illustrate that the extent to which risk concepts can form a basis for water security targets is moot. Fundamentally, decision making in response to risk can be approached from a cost-benefit perspective or from a tolerable or acceptable risk perspective (35) . The cost-benefit approach explicitly compares the costs of risk reduction with the marginal benefits, i.e., the difference between the risk before intervention and the residual risk afterward. There is no fixed target for residual risk other than it being, typically in some economic sense, optimal. The tolerable or acceptable risk perspective does admit that there is some threshold beyond which risk is unacceptable, but this may differ between individuals and society; society is particularly averse to incidents that impact large numbers of people (36) . The tolerability of risk is bound to vary depending on a society's economic development: Wealthy societies have resources to devote to risk reduction, whereas in less well-off societies there may well be more urgent priorities for investment that yield higher welfare benefits. Thus, the prospect of a universal target for tolerable water-related risk may prove to be ephemeral. Nonetheless, basic attention to risk management, particularly in the form of hazard warning, preemptive humanitarian assistance, and physical shelters from extreme climatic hazards, clearly and reliably yield high benefits even in the poorest societies (37) . Absence of this minimum platform of readily available and demonstrably cost-effective risk reduction does seem to be unacceptable (38). Notwithstanding the difficulty of establishing risk-based targets, development of metrics by which risk can be monitored is feasible. This is not straightforward because risk is not an observable quantity and the impacts of risk inevitably materialize, in part, in a random way (21) . Nonetheless, www.annualreviews.org • Water Security and Societythe factors that make up risk-hazard, exposure, and vulnerability-are all measurable and thus offer the potential for composite metrics of risk (see Section 3).
Beyond Definitions: Operationalizing Metrics
Recognition of water security as a twenty-first century challenge has been closely followed by a strong commitment to academic, government, development, and policy responses. Academic initiatives include interdisciplinary and integrated risk assessments as well as river basin observatories that couple social and natural dimensions of water security risks, and governance responses have become more common in locales as varied as the Saskatchewan Basin and the Ganges (39, 40) . The international science community has addressed water security in high-profile events that convened thought leaders across diverse disciplines and across research and practice; these include the 2012 Planet under Pressure event in London and the 2012 Oxford University conference on water security, risk, and society (41, 42) . The 2013 Bonn Conference on Water in the Anthropocene produced a Declaration on Global Water Security (43) that calls for "a renewed commitment to. . .multi-scale and interdisciplinary" water science and "state-of-the-art synthesis studies. . .to inform risk assessments" (p. 2). In addition, national research funding organizations launched an unprecedented multicountry collaboration-the Belmont Forum-with a priority theme of freshwater security.
Government initiatives include strategic assessments by intelligence agencies on security threats linked to water cooperation and conflict in densely populated river basins (16) . Iconic river basins have been assessed as at high risk of geopolitical instability or diminished economic growth owing to limited (Tigris-Euphrates, Nile, Mekong) or inadequate (Brahmaputra, Amu Darya) management capacity (16) . In this context, development agencies have examined the suitability of water security goals for inclusion in the Sustainable Development Goals under development, which will take effect after the 2015 deadline for the MDGs (19) .
Water security has also prompted increased collective action by industry. Corporate interest in water security spiked in the lead up to and aftermath of the Rio+20 meetings in 2012 and because of the perceived failure of public sector responses to water security threats (44) . The business case for water security has attracted attention to the role of water risks in internal operations, supply chains, and corporate social responsibility (45, 46) . The link between corporate water risk and metrics has been strengthened by the surveys and disclosures coordinated by the World Economic Forum annual global risks report (47-49) and the Carbon Disclosure Project, respectively (50).
Water Security and Risk: A Divided World?
The rapidly growing interest in water security and risk has been accompanied by a focus on water's relationship with poverty and development in the context of the MDGs and climate adaptation. Grey & Sadoff (27) argued that regions with more complex hydrology require higher levels of investment in institutions and infrastructure to achieve and sustain water security, particularly to manage hazards associated with hydrological variability. This work has been widely referenced and influential in the academic and policy discourse. Grey and colleagues (33) revisited this earlier argument to propose categories of water security based on two dimensions: hydrological complexity and investment in water security risk reduction. These dimensions divide the world on the basis of water-related hazards associated with hydrological complexity and the capacity to respond. Pathways to water security are expected to vary across these diverse settings. The present review considers the available evidence for these propositions and outlines some gaps in our understanding of key causal processes linking water security, development, and human well-being.
RISK PERSPECTIVES: KEY CONCEPTS
The words water security immediately suggest an opposite state of affairs: water insecurity. In conceptualizing water security, it may be more constructive to think in terms of the absence of water insecurity. Water insecurity is the state in which the conditions of the aquatic environment threaten the welfare and freedoms of individuals, communities, and societies. Water insecurity may result from the direct impacts of harmful events, for example, floods, droughts, or incidents of contamination. It may be due to more chronic factors undermining the capacity of individuals and communities to reach their full productive potential, for example, water-related disease or unreliable supplies of water for irrigation or industry. Or, it may result from inhibited investment due to the perception of water-related risks. Grey & Sadoff (51, p. 9) describe how the expectation of variability and the unpredictability of water resources can encourage "risk averse behavior at all levels of the economy in all years, as economic actors, particularly the poor, focus on minimizing their downside risks, rather than maximizing their potential gains." The disincentive to investment that water risk can pose extends beyond individual farm families to investments at all scales, including foreign direct investment.
All three manifestations of water insecurity (acute impacts, chronic impacts, perceived risks) have negative impacts on human welfare and often also on the environment. Water security is the opposite state, in which harmful states (or anticipated states) of the aquatic environment do not intolerably impact human welfare and the environment. Risk can never be entirely eliminated, but it can be tolerable because the threat of water insecurity is being managed through active intervention, which may take a variety of forms. The extent to which water-related hazards must be managed varies depending on hydroclimatic characteristics. Some aquatic environments are inherently more benign or malign than others.
Implicit in this discussion is the notion that water security is an objective that, to use the terminology of Herbert Simon, is satisficed (52) . In other words, there is some threshold (albeit imprecisely defined) beyond which water insecurity is no longer a concern and thus is tolerable. Actors at all scales (e.g., individuals, communities, firms, governments, societies) who have achieved this state cannot neglect water-related risks, as they still need to be managed, and a changing environment may make those risks more challenging. Moreover, expectations for risk reduction evolve with changing societal norms. Nonetheless, once risk is at a tolerable level, actors will prioritize other investments. Among those nonwater security priorities may be other investments in the aquatic environment, e.g., maximizing the output of hydropower plants, improving navigation, or bringing further agricultural land into production. These may or may not be productive waterrelated investments, but as they are primarily aimed at production gains rather than managing harmful risks, they are outside the ambit of water security as defined by Grey et al. (33) and elaborated on by Hall & Borgomeo (21) .
Earlier definitions of water security, although not explicitly risk-based [see, for example, the Global Water Partnership report (26) ], nonetheless include satisficing concepts in the emphasis on "enough safe water" (26, p. 12) ; the intuitive sense is that water is primarily of concern when it somehow threatens human and environmental well-being. An emphasis on managing potentially negative consequences (real or perceived) naturally leads to the risk-based definitions that have been proposed in recent years (7, 27, 33) .
Risk-based approaches to water resources planning existed well before the concept of water security (53, 54) , though the earliest journal references to risk and water relate to water pollution. The natural variability in hydrological systems naturally lends itself to stochastic analysis. The economic benefits of investment in schemes to regulate this variability are best posed as a problem of risk reduction. The increasing prevalence of cost-benefit analysis in the 1970s and 1980s Characterization of water security risks in terms of the probability and consequences of typical loss events.
superseded traditional standards-based planning and design methods and required more explicit analysis of risks and uncertainties (55) . Therefore, a well-tested apparatus exists for analysis of risks and appraisal of risk management investments.
The insurance industry has also contributed constructively to the lexicon of risk, in particular by distinguishing among hazard (the phenomenon with the potential to cause damage or harm), exposure (the people or assets that are in harm's way), and vulnerability (the susceptibility to loss should a hazard materialize) (56, 57) . Exposure refers to the people, livelihoods, infrastructure, and socioeconomic assets that could experience harm from hazardous events; vulnerability captures the propensity to experience harm as a function of the capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from such events. These components of risk map onto the well-known concept of risk as a product of probability and consequence (58), in which the probability of concern is that of a hazardous event materializing and the consequences are determined by the exposure and vulnerability.
The dimensions of probability and consequence help to distinguish between chronic (high probability) and acute (low probability, high consequence) risks. Figure 1 plots the main waterrelated risks (i.e., floods, droughts, inadequate supply/sanitation, water quantity/quality that is harmful to the environment) on these axes. Each phenomenon spans a range of probabilities: Floods can range from practically everyday events owing to inadequate stormwater drainage in urban areas to some of the most catastrophic events known to humankind; environmental harm can range from the chronic effects of diffuse pollution from agricultural land to tailings dam collapses that have contaminated entire rivers. The depiction of consequences, which span incommensurate economic, human, and environmental impacts, is also at best an approximation.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (known as SREX) (37), adopted the hazard-vulnerability-exposure structure, equating hazard, in the context of a report on climate change, with weather and climate events. This reverses the structure adopted in the previous IPCC report (59; based on 60) , in which vulnerability is taken as a function of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity, and, moreover, exposure is taken as containing the climate stimuli impacting a system. The SREX (37) definition clarifies how natural variability and anthropogenic climate change influence the occurrence of weather and climate events, whereas adaptation actions seek to reduce vulnerability and exposure to hazards.
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Characteristics of water-related risks in terms of hazard, vulnerability, and exposure, and the influences of climatic and socioeconomic changes upon risk.
We have adapted this characterization in Figure 2 . In the context of water-related risks, we observe that human intervention may also modify the nature of the hazard; for example, land use changes in the catchment may modify the probability of droughts and floods. When we consider risks from inadequate sanitation, then hazard, exposure, and adaptation are intertwined: The hazard is exposure to human feces, which occurs because of inadequate sanitary facilities. Similarly, pollution risks to the environment can materialize because of inadequate treatment of wastewater; human activities (in urban areas, industry, and agriculture) are the cause of the hazard. Drought hazards to the environment also necessarily entail human influence: The natural environment is adapted to variations in rainfall, soil moisture, and flow, including the incidence of occasional, and sometimes extreme, droughts. These hydroclimatic extremes become harmful to the natural environment when deliberate or inadvertent human intervention undermines an ecosystem's natural resilience to hydroclimatic variability.
Water security extends beyond the well-established framework for risk-based water resources planning in that it seeks to address disparate dimensions of water-related risk in an integrated way. Multiattribute water resources planning has existed for almost as long as decision analysis itself www.annualreviews.org • Water Security and Society (61) . However, the problems of water resources decisions have never been formulated in such broad terms as in the context of water security, which extends across all dimensions of water (supply, sanitation, irrigation, flood control), the full range of impacts (economic, social, environmental), and indirect consequences and spill-overs up to a global scale (foreign direct investment, trade in virtual water, migration). IWRM seeks to balance the multiple and sometimes conflicting aspects of an aquatic system (62), but IWRM has been criticized for inadequate operational interpretation (63) . Analysis of water security involves explicitly identifying the full set of water-related risks to all actors in a river basin (or other appropriate domain) for whom risk is potentially intolerable. Risk-based decision making inevitably involves trade-offs among actors, between different risks and costs, and through time. Analysis of water security involves explicitly answering risks of what, to whom, when, and under what circumstances and then seeking tolerable trade-offs. In a world in which water resources are increasingly contested and aquatic ecosystem services threatened, a satisficing approach to multiple water-related risks often seems to be the best we can hope for.
Trade-offs can materialize at multiple scales, which renders problematic the question of the appropriate scale of assessment and decision making. The river basin scale is the natural unit of assessment from a hydrological perspective because this is the scale at which hydrological connectivity is manifest, and thus it has been promoted in the context of IWRM (64) . The river basin scale encompasses upstream-downstream trade-offs and interactions. Risk assessment at that scale needs to be disaggregated to expose upstream-downstream inequities as well as sectors or regions experiencing disproportionate shares of the losses from a given event. However, not all issues of water security naturally fit into the river basin scale. For example, in Section 5.1 we examine water security in Singapore, an island city-state with several very small urbanized catchments that are interconnected by a sophisticated urban water infrastructure system, which does not fit the definition of a river basin at all. Furthermore, some of the most pressing water security issues are now experienced in rapidly expanding coastal cities (65) . At any scale of definition, exogenous factors and externalities need to be accounted for.
The framework of risk provides a route to decision making when the outcomes of future events are not definitively known (58). When the outcomes of future events (for example, the frequencies with which hazards will materialize) are known in probabilistic terms and utilities are well defined, then a normative route to decision making exists (66) . In an aquatic environment that is changing in unpredictable ways on a range of timescales, these prerequisites of well-defined probabilities and utilities seldom pertain. The increasing recognition of nonstationarity in the context of a changing climate is calling into doubt well-established methods for estimating the frequency of hydrological phenomena (67) . In the face of these severe uncertainties and the limited dependability of projections from climate models, increased emphasis has been placed on methods for testing the robustness of risk estimates and the sensitivity of decisions to severe uncertainties, including info-gap theory (68), robust decision making (69) , and decision scaling (70) . Each of these approaches focuses on extended sensitivity analysis of the sources and implications of severe uncertainty. The objective is to identify options that are robust to uncertainty in the sense that they perform acceptably well over a wide range of possible future conditions. Robustness, therefore, is a satisficing criterion, in that robust decisions must perform reasonably well rather than optimally well. Indeed, there is bound to be a trade-off between optimality and robustness to uncertainty (71) . Building in flexibility is one way of enhancing robustness, as is building capacity to recover from and learn from failure, in other words, resilience. Notions of robustness and resilience are increasingly associated with water security (72) , implying that tolerable risk, especially in a future in which uncertainties are severe, needs to be robustly achievable.
STATUS OF WATER SECURITY: INDICATORS, IMPACTS, AND EXPLANATORY FACTORS
In risk terms, water security is concerned with the consequences and perceptions of chronic hazards and extremes and with the factors influencing exposure and vulnerability. Geographic and socioeconomic disparities in access to safe drinking water and vulnerability to extreme events have also stimulated interest in the relationship between water security and development. This has required careful efforts to define indicators of water insecurity to elucidate the causal linkages among water-related hazards and impacts. This section considers conceptual aspects of water security indicators, metrics of basic needs, multidimensional indicators, water vulnerability indicators, impacts of water insecurity, and methodological issues.
Conceptual Aspects of Water Security Indicators
Indicators of water insecurity measure hazards and their impacts; they range in coverage from a single component to multiple dimensions and vary in spatial and temporal resolution (73, 74) (see Table 1 ). Water security indicators are subject to all of the same conceptual and methodological issues associated with indicators more generally, namely, problems with complexity and causality, difficulties constructing composite indicators based on multiple components, and a lack of reliable and comparable data (75) . A risk-based framework differentiates hazard, exposure, and vulnerability as measurable quantities (21) . Water security indicators are concerned with risk in terms of the frequency and severity of rare hazardous events, such as those related to climatic variability and extremes (e.g., droughts, floods, unpredictable timing of rainfall or runoff ). They are also focused on chronic hazards associated with the lack of access to water supply and sanitation, poor water quality, insufficient water quantity for food and energy production, and degradation of ecosystem services (22, 24) .
Water indicators have proliferated: Plummer et al. (74) identify 50 water vulnerability assessment tools. Water security, from a risk-based perspective, implies particular challenges for the development of indicators because risk is not a measurable quantity, is highly context dependent, and depends on the perceptions of and attitudes toward risk of various stakeholders. Thus, any metric is bound to be a composite incorporating elements of hazard, vulnerability, exposure, and perhaps also adaptive capacity from a range of perspectives (21) . In practice, many water indicators, including long-standing ones related to basic water needs, are now being incorporated into a basket of metrics that may contribute to the development of indicators of water security (76, 77) .
Measuring Basic Needs: Drinking Water, Food, and Ecosystems
Since the 1980s, indicators of water insecurity have concentrated on the water needed for self-sufficient food production (78, 79) and drinking water and sanitation (3, 80). Falkenmark (78) used measures of annual renewable water availability per capita to identify thresholds associated with self-sufficiency in food production, namely, 1,700 m 3 /(person · year) (stress), 1,000 m 3 /(person · year) (scarcity), and 500 m 3 /(person · year) (absolute scarcity). Allan (81) has established a threshold of 1,200 m 3 /(person · year) for water security, although international trade can buffer local water deficits by importing water-intensive commodities. Measured at the national level, neither of these metrics of water security for food production accounts for spatial variation within the country or for seasonal or interannual variability (29 1980s (4) . The proportion of the global population with access to improved drinking water increased from 76% in 1990 (4.0 billion total) to 89% (6.3 billion total) in 2012, and the proportion of the global population with access to improved sanitation increased from 49% (2.6 billion) to 64% (4.5 billion) during the same period (5) .
The MDG target is to halve the proportion of the population without access to safe drinking water and sanitation. Hope & Rouse (4) identify three challenges for drinking water security: population growth, regional variation in access, and monitoring uncertainty. First, countries with low baselines and high population growth face larger challenges (83). In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, there has even been a net increase in the population-in absolute terms-without access to improved water supplies even though the proportion with access increased by 16 percentage points between 1990 and 2012. Second, access varies regionally; many of the populations that are most difficult to reach and in the greatest need experience lags. Third, there are methodological challenges to establishing "accurate and comparable metrics" (4, p. 2). On top of these deficits, the JMP recognizes that improved water supplies are not always safe; piped water in many major developing country cities is contaminated and may be inadequate in other ways (e.g., distance, reliability, cultural acceptability, affordability). Bulk averages also mask disparities within countries (urban/rural) and by wealth, religion, ethnicity, and education level.
Meeting basic water needs for food security also poses challenges, as 70% of global water withdrawals support irrigation, in addition to the rainfall used for rainfed agriculture. The population exposed to severe water stress for food production is projected to increase (10) . The Irrigation Water Supply Reliability index provides a supply-demand ratio: water available for irrigation (i.e., supply) as a proportion of the total potential demand for irrigation water. The index is projected to decrease from 0.71 globally in 2000 to 0.66 in 2050, indicating intensifying scarcity. The index varies regionally; water-stressed regions are the hardest hit, particularly during low-flow years (8) . These metrics of basic water needs and water for food provide a baseline against which recent trends and future projections can be understood to inform policy and management decisions.
There is increasing recognition that the water needs of people and agriculture depend on the goods and services generated by ecosystems (84) . Environmental water security has been conceptualized and measured using an ecosystem services framework. The Asian Development Bank (76) , for example, has developed a river health index following the themes and drivers identified by Vorosmarty et al. (2): watershed disturbance, pollution, water resource development, and biotic factors.
The Multidimensional Nature and Drivers of Water Insecurity: Composite Indices
The links between water security and sustainability and between water security and economic growth have required indicators that account for interacting physical and human-driven hazards and causal processes. Srinivasan et al. (85) note that the nature and sources of the global water crisis vary regionally across different patterns of demand, supply, infrastructure development, and governance. Understanding the nature of the water crisis and the determinants of water insecurity are prerequisites for informed decisions about institutional development and infrastructure investment. Water security is also considered part of a web of interrelated concerns about energy, national, and food security (86) .
Water use as a proportion of total renewable supplies (the water exploitation index) is used to calculate water stress (1). Population growth, urbanization, and food security are important drivers of these conventional measures of water stress (1, 87). However, the ratio of water use to availability does not account for deficits in infrastructure to make use of available water and to buffer against seasonal and interannual fluctuations (29) . Water stress and water scarcity indicators have therefore distinguished physical water scarcity from economic water scarcity. The former refers to high levels of water use as a proportion of available supplies, whereas the latter refers to inadequate access to water infrastructure to make use of available water (88) . Measures of economic water scarcity identify parts of Africa where water infrastructure, not water availability, is the limiting factor. Population and infrastructure are also a major influence on exposure to extreme events such as flooding. For example, population growth and poorly managed infrastructure drove a doubling of exposure to extreme rainfall events in South America between 1960 and 2000 (89) .
Multiattribute indicators assess the coincidence of hazards at multiple scales, including at high spatial resolution (2, 90); at the country level, particularly in Asia (76, 77) ; and for transboundary waters (see Table 2 ) (91, 92) . Composite indicators increasingly combine chronic and episodic hazards. For example, the seven elements of the 2000 Ministerial Declaration of The Hague on Water Security in the 21st Century (25) included the basic needs of drinking and food but also the importance of risk management and transboundary cooperation (23). Lautze & Manthrithilake (77) provide a multidimensional index of water security that accounts for five dimensions: basic needs, agriculture, environment, risk management, and independence (the last being a function of water generated within a country). The Asian Development Bank (76) has also compiled a multiattribute metric based on household, economic, urban, and environmental water security as well as resilience to water-related disasters. This approach has the potential to obscure which subcomponents are the drivers of water insecurity [e.g., similar to the critique of multidimensional water poverty indicators by Molle & Mollinga (93) ].
The water vulnerability assessment tools identified by Plummer and colleagues (74) vary in terms of their location and sociopolitical context, scale, and number of dimensions. Key dimensions include water resources, other physical attributes, economic aspects, social characteristics, and institutions. Physical attributes and economic aspects are well represented by 100% and 66% of the 50 vulnerability indices, respectively. By comparison, institutional and social dimensions were captured in only 34% and 26% of the indices, respectively. Plummer et al. emphasized the importance of holistic measures that account for social and ecological factors, as well as the capacity for IWRM.
Limited attention has been paid to the development of indicators of the adaptation actions that have been taken to reduce water-related risks. Hallegatte et al. (94) acknowledge this lacuna in their analysis of flood risk to port cities. Global data on water-related infrastructure investments are emerging from a variety of sources, and global water resource assessments have begun to incorporate reservoir storage and operation (95) and assessments of investment needs (96) . However, these assessments do not indicate how much risk has (or could be) decreased as a consequence of these investments. Monitoring of the effectiveness of infrastructure investments has mostly taken place at national and local scales, most recently in the context of development of adaptation indicators (97) , though seldom specifically in terms of water security.
Several recent initiatives aim to measure institutional dimensions of water vulnerability and adaptation, highlighted by the OECD Water Governance Initiative (WGI) (98). The OECD has organized a framework for conceptualizing and measuring water governance capacity. The 
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WGI addresses multilevel governance gaps across seven categories measured at the country scale, including policy and financial gaps. This builds on prior water governance indicators at the country level, including the Asia Water Governance Index (99) and its precursors (100), which are based on water policy, law, and administration. Neither the OECD Water Governance Initiative nor the Asia Water Governance Index explicitly address water security risks or the role of local or transboundary water governance and institutions. The specter of water wars and risk of violent conflict between countries sharing international transboundary rivers have spurred efforts to measure conflict and cooperation and their institutional determinants. Institutional capacity influences whether countries cooperate over shared watercourses; conflicts are expected to occur when rapid change (environmental or social) outstrips institutional capacity to absorb it (101, 102) . Indicators of institutional capacity in transboundary waters measure the presence or absence of treaties and river basin organizations (103) . More recently, indicators have gone beyond presence or absence to capture the quality of these institutions and attributes of institutional design associated with strong performance, such as membership and financial capacity (104) . Measures of institutional resilience have also been tailored to the specific water-related risks associated with climate variability. In addition to treaties and river basin organizations, institutional resilience to climate variability is expected to depend on water allocation mechanisms, variability management provisions, and conflict resolution (17) . One global analysis of institutional resilience to climate variability compared current conditions with future projections for 2050 and identified Northern and sub-Saharan Africa as at greatest risk today and Western Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America as at increasing risk in the future (17).
Impacts of Water Insecurity
The impacts of water insecurity include the consequences of climate hazards and of inadequate water for basic needs for people, food, and ecosystems. Metrics of climate risks capture exposure (e.g., population, assets) and vulnerability (propensity to experience harm) to hazardous climatic events. The population living in the floodplain is a common measure of exposure to climate hazards, whereas vulnerability refers to the underlying social and economic conditions affecting adaptive capacity. Observed and modeled losses from climate hazards inform the selection of threshold levels of hazard frequency (e.g., 1-in-100-year events) or severity (accumulated deficits from droughts) associated with intolerable impacts. As a proportion of GDP, economic losses from natural disasters are higher in developing countries than in developed ones (105). The expansion of assets at risk places middle-income countries at the highest risk, where as much as 1% of GDP was lost owing to climate extremes during the period from 2001 to 2006, although this estimate is based on limited evidence (37, 106) .
The literature on the impacts of water insecurity also examines the benefits and costs of access to improved water supply and sanitation (and the social and economic losses associated with inadequate water services). The four main sources of information about these benefits and costs are market vending data, stated preferences, averted expenditures (costs of coping with inadequate services), and avoided costs of illness (107) . Social and economic losses associated with inadequate water services include the costs of coping with inadequate water services and of illness. For example, a 2005 study of Kathmandu (108) documents the coping costs incurred by those with poor water quality, including costs associated with water collection, pumping, and in-house treatment, at almost US$3/(person · month), or 1% of monthly income. Improved water supply and sanitation should therefore limit those costs, and investment would thus occur when the costs incurred in the form of illness, coping, and lost labor exceed the costs of improving the service. The avoided costs of illness are not always sufficient to motivate investment. As a consequence, drinking water security has languished in some areas. Opportunity costs associated with the search for water are a potential motivation to invest; large time savings can be realized when facilities are brought closer to, or ideally into, the home. In many analyses of the economic impacts of sanitation, time savings are an important economic factor (109, 110) . In addition, 2.4 million deaths per year are considered preventable with improved access to water and sanitation and good hygiene practices (111, 112) . The impacts of inadequate access to water, sanitation, and hygiene include US$340 million in household costs and US$7 billion in costs to national health systems per year, with the poorest being the most vulnerable (111, 113) .
Water Indicators, Development, and Causality
The uneven distribution of water risks has focused attention on the linkages between water and development. Vorosmarty et al. (2) describe the residual water security threats-the adjusted human water security threat-after accounting for the effects of infrastructure investments to www.annualreviews.org • Water Security and Societyenhance water security. Of the regions with high water security threats, the regions with the highest incomes have the greatest capacity to reduce their residual threats. For example, the Western United States and Europe have invested heavily to reduce their residual water security threats by up to 95% from unadjusted threat levels, whereas low and low-middle income regions face the highest residual water security threats (affecting more than 3 billion people). This high-resolution global analysis corroborates more localized, case-specific evidence on geographic disparities in capacity to cope with water security threats. For example, models of Ethiopia's agriculture-dependent economy suggest a 38% reduction in economic growth potential owing to hydrological variability (114) .
The existing evidence about the relationship between water security and development raises complex questions about causality. How does water security or its absence influence economic development? Is water security a precondition for economic development, or can it be achieved as a by-product of wider economic development that provides the capacity to invest in risk reduction measures (115) ? Macroeconomic modeling has been used to address these questions by identifying the effects of tropical climate dynamics on economic development (116, 117) . Using malaria risk as an explanatory factor, Sachs (117) critiqued studies that identified institutional quality as the dominant influence on development (118). Brown and colleagues (13, 29, 119) have examined the impact of climate hazards on economic wealth and growth. They found that a positive correlation exists between measures of climatic variability and poverty (29) . South Asia was identified as a hot spot where soft and hard infrastructure is insufficient to manage interannual and seasonal climate variability. Extreme events are a particularly hazardous form of climate variability; global crosscountry modeling indicates that a 1% increase in drought (flood) area reduces the GDP growth rate by 2.8% (1.8%) (13).
Methodological Issues
The proliferation of water security indicators raises several methodological issues. Dickin and colleagues (120) review the use of index approaches to measure and communicate complex information about water vulnerability. Criticisms of indices include their reductionist nature (simplifying inherently complex information and causal processes) and the choice of components and their weighting (equal weight, stakeholder elicitation, expert judgment, and regression modeling) (93, 120) . Methodological rigor and transparency are needed for indices to provide credible, salient, and legitimate information to decision makers (121) .
As risk is not directly observable, indicators measure the components comprising risk, namely, hazard and vulnerability (21) . The occurrence of extreme events is by definition infrequent, so long time series of measurements are required to generate stable risk estimates (120) . However, risk is bound to change in the meantime, so empirical risk estimates are biased. Some of the risks under consideration may never have been observed, in which case risk estimates must be generated with analysis of the ( joint) likelihood of contributory circumstances.
Measurement of hazards is constrained by the lack of observed data to improve understanding of the frequency and severity of hazardous events. A prime example is the decrease in the number of hydrological monitoring sites and the persistent disparity between the rich and poor parts of the world with regard to the density of such sites (122). Data on rare events and their impacts are also sparse despite the development of disaster databases, such as the EM-DAT database, that rely on global, regional, and national accounts of events recorded by the UN and governments. The databases represent an improvement on media-based reports, although there are methodological challenges for defining disasters (123) and the associated losses (lives, damage costs, number affected), particularly for events with moderate severity or localized effects. Measures of vulnerability must also cover both direct and indirect impacts over varying temporal and spatial scales. Droughts and floods, for example, are complex socio-natural events for which our understanding of impacts is constrained by a lack of clear baselines and differential effects that depend on the scales of analysis (124) . For example, droughts come in multiple forms, ranging from seasonal and localized to continental and decadal (125, 126) . Measures of water insecurity and its impacts must therefore be considered in terms of policy and political decision processes to reduce insecurity.
PATHWAYS TO WATER SECURITY
The discussion above demonstrates the risk perspective for framing and measuring water security to inform investments in risk reduction. Pathways to water security consider the intervention or mix of interventions aimed at reducing the negative consequences of water-related hazards.
What Are Pathways?
The term pathway has received ample attention in a range of settings, particularly in relation to development and development paths (72, 127) . Pathways to water security refer to a sequence of investments in institutions and infrastructure to reduce water-related risks (128) . The most effective investment options in any given setting depend heavily on context and path dependency in the sense that past decisions and investments both open and foreclose alternative future trajectories (129). Here we explore the emerging evidence about pathways to water security in terms of institutional reform and infrastructure, as well as the interaction and sequencing of the two. In Section 5, two well-studied cases illustrate the evolution of pathways to water security in a rural (Murray-Darling, Australia) and an urban (Singapore) setting.
Institutional Reform
Water security risk reduction requires governance capacity and collective action at multiple levels to study, plan, finance, and implement measures that reduce vulnerability to water-related hazards. The types of governance arrangements employed can vary considerably across responses to inadequate water supply and sanitation, climate hazards, and other water-related hazards. Although Sachs (117) and others have demonstrated the primacy of geographic determinants of growth and water insecurity, institutions do matter. Institutions are defined in the broadest sense of the term as human-devised constraints structuring human interaction with one another and with the natural environment (130) .
The elements comprising institutional pathways to water security can be placed into three categories: good governance generally (e.g., rule of law), water governance (e.g., water policy, law and administration), and water policy instruments to mitigate and adapt to specific water-related risks (e.g., flood insurance). Many researchers have sought to identify the attributes of institutional design associated with sustainability, robustness, and resilience in water management. No single approach, blueprint, or pathway exists to achieve water security, yet a set of broad principles has been identified for common pool water resources, including the need for clearly defined boundaries to determine who has access to the resource, proportionate sharing of costs and benefits, monitoring and enforcement of rules to promote trust and investment, conflict resolution mechanisms, and nested governance arrangements that match well with local conditions (22, (129) (130) (131) (132) . For example, Pahl-Wostl and colleagues (132) identify 29 attributes associated with water governance arrangements that enhance adaptive capacity and water security. Comparing 29 river basins, the study found that, on one hand, polycentricity (multiple centers of authority, coupled with strong coordination) is critical to foster local governance capacity and coordination mechanisms that bridge local and larger jurisdictions; on the other hand, traditional prescriptions for strong legal frameworks and water planning appear to be "quite futile in countries with limited statehood where formal institutions are not effective" (132, p. 33) . Therefore, institutional pathways also refer to the general rule of law in society and the associated transparency, anticorruption measures, fiscal arrangements, and mixture of decentralization and regulation needed to foster effective governance.
These two types of institutional investments-water specific and general rule-of-law-have been combined. For example, in Spain a transparency index for water management examines transparency across 80 indicators in six thematic areas related to water governance (133) . In this analysis, transparency is viewed as a lagging measure of institutional development as socioeconomic status improves.
Well-defined property rights are a foundation for water security. They stipulate who gets access to water and how decisions are made (134) . By providing security of ownership and signaling information about resource use and conditions, property rights have the potential to foster trust and norms of reciprocity and thereby to stimulate further investment to reduce risks. Property rights and water apportionment among political jurisdictions (national or subnational) establish the benefit and cost sharing provisions needed to spur investments in infrastructure. For example, interstate water apportionment agreements enabled the dam building era in the western United States and southeast Australia (135) . However, water security for existing stakeholders (e.g., irrigation and hydropower) may come at the expense of emerging stakeholders (e.g., cities or the environment). Lock-in is possible when historic commitments create vested interests that resist change (136) . The interaction between and sequencing of water-specific and general governance reforms is worthy of closer scrutiny, as is the interaction between institutions and infrastructure.
Infrastructure Investment
Traditionally, infrastructure engineering design has focused on projects, i.e., major capital investment decisions. Since the 1980s, increasing emphasis on economic appraisal and specifically cost-benefit analysis has been intended to apply economic rigor to those choices. The role that any particular investment had in macroeconomic development at the river basin or national scale was implicit given that benefits were shown to exceed costs at the micro scale. When thinking about water security, we recognize the effects that sequences of investments have on cumulatively modifying water-related risks. Major capital investment decisions can lock in particular pathways of development and exclude future options.
As noted above, the notion of pathways deliberately addresses questions of sequencing, lockin, and cumulative risks. Framing decision problems in terms of risk management pathways has proven to be particularly attractive in the context of adaptation planning. For example, the Deltacommissie (137) explored the impacts of climate change, including accelerated sea level rise, on the water management system in the Netherlands, seeking to identify options and thresholds for adaptation. The alternative risk management pathways have been described in detail by Haasnoot and colleagues (138, 139) , who graphically depict potential sequences of investment decisions in the Netherlands. In an analysis of options for adapting the Thames Estuary to rising sea level, uncertainty about future climate change was removed from the analysis by designing the adaptation pathways with respect to a climate indicator variable (sea level rise in that case) rather than with respect to time (140) . This scenario-neutral approach has also been adopted in strategic planning for the infrastructure of the Great Lakes (141).
Almost invariably, appraisal of risks is a multiattribute decision problem. Risk and costs materialize and need to be appraised with respect to multiple dimensions. A focus on risk also inevitably leads to exploration of variability and uncertainty in appraisal decisions. Harvey et al. (142) propose a multilayer decision analysis framework for risk-based appraisal of sequences of investment decisions under uncertainty. Their approach involves extensive sampling of natural variability to compute water-related risks and their change through time. Above this inner simulation layer, sequences of risk management options are formulated as strategies that may be time or system state dependent and then played out through a simulation framework. In the outer layer of the decision analysis framework, sensitivity to major sources of epistemic uncertainty, for example, in climate or demographic change, is explored. The aim of this type of appraisal framework, and those proposed by Lempert & Groves (69) , Brown et al. (141) , and Hine & Hall (68) , is to identify investment options and pathways that are, as far as possible, robust to severe uncertainties in the sense that they perform acceptably well (i.e., risk is not intolerably high) across a range of possible futures.
Thus far, methodologies for risk-based appraisal of robust infrastructure investment pathways have been applied in a relatively small number of settings on the boundary between research and practice. Decision makers are fearful of apparently complex approaches that are conceptually challenging and can be computationally expensive to apply. However, in many respects, appraisal of risks and pathways under uncertainty represents a fairly modest development of existing appraisal methodologies (143) , as it simply applies a more exhaustive approach to the sensitivity analysis that is an essential element of robust appraisal in any case. Proper appraisal of risks and uncertainties is given limited attention when considering that management of risks has become ubiquitous in thinking about economic development (38, 48). The tools of risk analysis and management are well established and provide a methodological toolkit for appraising pathways to water security.
PATHWAYS TO WATER SECURITY IN RIVER BASINS AND CITIES: TWO EXAMPLES
Using the typologies of water-human systems identified by Grey et al. (33) and Srinivasan et al. (85) , we review two well-studied case studies of pathways to water security in contrasting urban (Singapore) and rural (the Murray-Darling River of Australia) settings. For each, we consider the accumulated evidence about the dominant water-related risks and the type and sequencing of institutional and infrastructure responses.
Singapore: Long-Term Management of an Existential Risk
Singapore is a highly urbanized city state with an area of 700 km 2 and the second highest population density in the world. Although Singapore's annual rainfall of 2,400 mm is well above the global average of 1,050 mm (144), it is not sufficient to provide water to a population of 5.3 million and an industry sector that consumes 42% of the water supplied (145) . Prior to independence in 1965, when it had a much smaller population, Singapore supplied its water through three reservoirs in its own territory and transfer via pipeline from Malaysia. The 1961 transfer agreement with Malaysia expired in 2011, and the 1962 agreement will expire in 2061. Ever since independence, Singapore has felt vulnerable to interruption in its water supply from Malaysia. Veiled threats by Malaysia in the 1960s that it might use water as an instrument of foreign policy (145) have driven a major long-term program in Singapore to reduce dependence on imported water and to retain the option of complete self-sufficiency. However, Singapore says that it will continue to buy water from Malaysia if it is available at a reasonable price (146) .
Thus, Singapore has a water security challenge in the very obvious sense of a threat to national security. However, as in all water security settings, trade-offs and uncertainties are associated with managing those risks. Water self-sufficiency is technically achievable, but even in a relatively prosperous state, trade-offs exist with the costs of doing so and with the political acceptability of the prices paid by water consumers. Singapore has therefore adopted a long-term strategy for achieving affordable water security. This has meant developing an integrated portfolio of approaches that focuses on the lowest cost options while promoting innovation and retaining flexibility for the future. The starting points are maximizing the use of rainfall on the island and managing per capita demand. Runoff from two-thirds of the island's area is captured, and the Public Utilities Board hopes to extend this to 90% of the island's area (144) . This work has been accompanied by vigorous source protection, for example, by regulating cattle farming near rural watercourses and implementing draconian city ordinances to limit contamination in urban areas and from industry (145, 146) . Leakage from the supply system averages approximately 4.5% (144) , which is exceptionally low for an urban water supply. Meanwhile, per capita demand has been managed through a combination of pricing, water efficiency measures, and public education. An increasing block tariff structure penalizes excessive domestic use. These policies led to a drop in domestic demand from 176 L/(day · person) in 1994 to 157 L/(day · person) in 2007 (144) .
The first desalination plant was constructed at Tuas in 2005, and a second, larger plant at Tuaspring was opened in 2013, but desalination is more costly than water reuse, in which Singapore has been a pioneer. Water reuse, which is known as NEWater in Singapore, has been controversial worldwide. For example, when Australia's driest state, Queensland, proposed the addition of recycled wastewater to its drinking water supply, the public rejected the idea (147) . A relatively costeffective and sustainable water supply thus suffers from the risk of public unacceptability. Singapore managed this risk by developing the technology over a period of decades and progressively raising public awareness. The first experimental reuse plant was closed in 1975 because it proved to be uneconomical and unreliable. A new plant was completed in 2000, and water quality was monitored over a period of two years, when an expert panel approved the water for use in the public supply (146) .
Singapore is noteworthy in having taken a long-term and integrated approach to water resources management. The strategic direction was set at independence and has been implemented through sustained investment in water institutions and infrastructure. The Public Utilities Board has overall responsibility for the water resources system, and use of sustainable water resources has been embedded in land use legislation and building regulations. The infrastructure system has been developed with staged investments and progressively integrated to enable efficient management of the resources. The Public Utilities Board has promoted technological (e.g., NEWater and desalination) and institutional (tariff structures) innovation.
Looking forward, population and industrial growth continue to challenge Singapore's water security objectives. In the face of uncertainties around population, technology, and relations with Malaysia, Singapore has adopted a diversified approach. Although a least cost approach would suggest an emphasis on surface water and NEWater, Singapore has invested to retain the option to expand new technologies that may become more cost-effective in the future. One example is desalination by freezing using liquefied natural gas regasification as a heat sink (148) . Zhang & Babovic (149) used real options analysis to compute the option value of investing in this new technology, which may prove to be highly beneficial in some, but not all, future scenarios.
Singapore has addressed the existential risk of water dependence on its neighbor while managing public concerns about affordability and use of recycled water for human consumption. This has involved a long-term and highly strategic approach that couples investment in institutions and infrastructure. Facing a future that is uncertain in significant respects, the strategic approach has become more sophisticated in its analysis of uncertainties and options for managing future risks.
Murray-Darling: Water Security for Irrigation and Ecosystems
The Murray-Darling Basin of Southeast Australia contains three of Australia's longest rivers-the Murray, Darling, and Murrumbidgee-which drain more than 1 million km 2 or one-seventh of Australia's landmass. The basin receives 457 mm of rainfall annually and is distinguished by its climatic variability and exposure to extremes, namely, flooding and prolonged droughts (124, 125) . In the 240 years since European settlement, 80 of those years have been classified as droughts (126) . Multiyear droughts have occurred at key periods in Australia's political and economic development, including the Settlement Drought (1790-1793), Federation Drought (1895-1903), World War II drought (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) ) and the Big Dry or Millennium Drought (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ). Flooding has also been a defining challenge in the region, as exemplified by the Queensland flooding in 2011 that led to a 0.3% downgrade in GDP growth for Australia, an estimated $1.6 billion in lost crop production, and $10 billion in reconstruction costs (150) .
The Murray-Darling Basin has supported an aboriginal population for at least 50,000 years. Irrigation development has been a major focus of regional development, particularly since the late nineteenth century. Water storage reservoirs were built along the Murray in the mid-twentieth century to increase water security for agriculture; this was part of a larger attempt to drought-proof the basin that also included the completion of Hume dam in the 1930s and the Snowy Mountain interbasin diversion scheme active in the 1950s to 1970s (127) . These investments in infrastructure followed a series of agreements dating from the colonial period among the three main states (Victoria, New South Wales, and South Australia) on the River Murray and the Commonwealth government. The institutional architecture was built on the 1914-1915 River Murray Waters Agreement of the state and Commonwealth governments to share the construction, financing, and management of reservoirs. This agreement was innovative because it allocated water proportionally among the upstream states to share the risks of climate variability while providing fixed deliveries to downstream South Australia (127) .
The Murray-Darling Basin supports approximately $15 billion in agricultural production annually ($5.5 billion of that in irrigated agriculture) and 65% of Australia's irrigated agriculture (72) . Investments in infrastructure facilitated the expansion of irrigation acreage, reducing annual average outflows from the Basin at its terminus-the Murray Mouth-from 12.23 to 4.7 billion m 3 (72) . Efforts to drought-proof the basin were therefore partially successful, as evidenced by the impacts of the Millennium Drought. Storage infrastructure and water markets enabled increases in the productivity of water and allocative efficiency (the allocation of water to its highest valued economic use). Despite a 70% decrease in the water available for irrigation in the 2008-2009 water year compared with the baseline of the 2000-2001 water year, the gross value of irrigated agriculture declined by less than 20% (128) .
Water security for irrigation has come at a cost. By the late 1970s, irrigation expansion and dryland farming had contributed to salinity problems, which triggered efforts to limit additional water diversions (129). By a 2010 assessment of environmental water requirements, 20 of the 23 river valleys of the basin were in poor condition, revealing the trade-offs between water security for the environment and for irrigation (151) . Sustaining water security has involved ongoing reform to institutions and additional investments in infrastructure. The 1992 Murray-Darling Basin Agreement inaugurated a 20-year reform package to establish diversion limits, enable water trading, and transition to sustainable levels of extraction. The 2007 Water Act and ensuing basinwide plan adopted in 2012 are the latest milestones in this pathway to water security, although progress has been contested in efforts to balance water security for irrigation and the environment (152) . The Act established the Murray-Darling Basin Authority as a new federal authority to define environmental water requirements and adopt sustainable diversion limits, leading to a commitment to return 2.75 billion m 3 from irrigation to the environment. The blueprint for the Act was the National Action Plan for Water Security, which led to a AUD$12.9 billion recovery package, the Water for the Future Program in 2008. The recovery package enhanced water security through a mix of institutional reforms, infrastructure investments, and information systems, namely, a water entitlement buyback scheme (AUD$3.1 billion), irrigation infrastructure efficiency enhancements (AUD$5.9 billion), and a national water market system, respectively.
Global onlookers confronting similar threats from climate hazards and water scarcity are closely scrutinizing the lessons from Australia's pathway to water security. Pittock (153) argues that the Murray-Darling Basin is an important test case globally; this experience has demonstrated the importance of adequate environmental water allocations, iterative planning mechanisms, proportional water allocations, and careful design of new environmental works and measures (i.e., infrastructure). The Murray-Darling Basin has also been compared with other mid-latitude continental river basins (Colorado, Orange, Yellow) to highlight the need to: (a) harness crises, (b) analyze trade-offs between consumptive and environmental water uses, (c) share climate risks between water users and the environment, (d ) use water markets to reduce the costs of adapting water allocations (and potentially avoid costly new infrastructure), and (e) build nested governance arrangements to coordinate trade-offs (154) . A long-term commitment and coordinated approach to institutional reform and infrastructure investment remain necessary to make trade-offs between water security for irrigation and the environment.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Attention to water security has arguably never been greater, although the dominant threats to water security vary geographically and over time. Risk concepts have been used to define and analyze water security more rigorously and systematically across disciplines and across researchpractice networks, particularly since the 2000 UN Ministerial Declaration of The Hague on Water Security in the 21st Century identified risk management among its central principles. However, only in the past decade has risk been used explicitly to measure and explain water security and inform management responses. Indicators of water stress and water vulnerability have the potential to elucidate the status and drivers of water insecurity and its relationship with development and human well-being. Conceptual and methodological challenges remain. Composite indicators combine social and natural dimensions of hazards and vulnerability, which underpin efforts to diagnose the nature and sources of water insecurity and how these vary. A better understanding of the drivers and status of water security is the foundation for informed decisions about policy reform and infrastructure investments to reduce vulnerability. The experiences of Singapore and the Murray-Darling Basin illustrate contrasting pathways of institutional reform and investment to achieve and sustain water security and to manage residual risks and trade-offs. Recent efforts to improve methodologies for comparative water studies (155) and to undertake diagnostic studies of water security risks and responses hold promise and highlight a key future priority for research.
SUMMARY POINTS
1. Water insecurity poses a major challenge for science and society in the twenty-first century across multiple dimensions, from drinking water and food to climate extremes and geopolitical instability of transboundary waters.
2. Across these dimensions, water security has become closely associated with risks driven by chronic hazards (inadequate water supply and sanitation) and climate extremes (waterrelated disasters).
3. Water-related hazards and vulnerability have influenced development paths, although our understanding of the causal mechanisms and feedbacks connecting water security and development remains patchy and highly context specific.
4. Risk concepts provide a lexicon and analytical toolbox to measure water security and to inform trade-offs about water-related risks and their distribution.
5. The social construction and perceptions of risk affect the tolerability of risks and the willingness to undertake investments in institutional reform and infrastructure to reduce vulnerability.
6. Metrics of water-related risks have proliferated and underpin the development of multidimensional water security indicators that pay varying attention to complex social and natural attributes of hazards, exposure, and vulnerability.
7. The dominant threats to water security vary geographically and over time. The quantity of investment in infrastructure and institutions that is required to achieve water security depends on the exposure to water-related risks and the stock of preexisting investments.
8. Pathways to water security are conceived as a context-sensitive sequence of investments in institutions and infrastructure to reduce water-related risks and yield benefits for the economy and the environment.
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